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Collective Bargaining in 
Provincial Public Administration 
Sandra Christensen 
It is the purpose of this paper to assess empirically the extent 
to which public sector pay rates closely track the private sector in 
response to cyclical changes in the economy, as measured by the 
rate of inflation and labour vacancy rates; and to détermine 
whether the introduction of collective bargaining in the public sec-
tor has altered this relationship in any significant way. 
Among employées in public administration in Canada, the privilège to 
bargain over pay is nearly universal and frequently includes the légal right 
to strike in the event of an impasse in negotiations. By contrast, ail bargain-
ing over pay is forbidden to employées in public administration in England, 
and in the fédéral and most state sectors in the United States. Canada's dis-
tinctive approach to pay détermination in public administration first ap-
peared during the 1960's, when each of the fédéral and provincial jurisdic-
tions liberalized législation governing public sector labor relations1. 
However, in récent years, there hâve been fréquent expressions of con-
cern about the conséquences of collective bargaining in the public sector. A 
number of authors hâve outlined the a priori arguments which would lead 
one to expect that bargaining demands in the public sector will be ïess con-
strained than those in the private sector, based on the absence of the profit 
motive and the inelasticity of demand for most public sector services2. 
Gunderson (1979) has presented évidence that a pay premium does in fact 
exist for employées in the public sector (defined as employées in public ad-
ministration in ail three levels of government), relative to comparable em-
ployées in the private sector. Further, évidence presented elsewhere by 
Gunderson (1978) suggests that this pay premium may hâve first appeared 
* CHRISTENSEN, Sandra, Professor of Economies, Simon Fraser University. 
1 See GOLDENBERG, 1979, pp. 256-257. The province of Saskatchewan is an excep-
tion to the gênerai liberalization beginning in the 1960's, only because labour législation in that 
province has never excluded public employées from the bargaining privilège enjoyed by private 
sector employées. 
2 See AULD, 1979; CHRISTENSEN, 1980; COURCHENE, 1977; GUNDERSON, 
1979. 
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in the mid-1960's, when public sector pay bargaining was first widely intro-
duced. The data we use hère, on average weekly earnings at the provincial 
level, show that the ratio of public to private sector earnings increased an 
average of 12 percent after the introduction of collective bargaining for 
employées in provincial public administration. 
Concerns about the conséquences of collective bargaining in the public 
sector hâve been reflected by government at the fédéral level by (as yet un-
successful) proposais to amend the Public Service Staff Relations Act to 
mandate the maintenance of pay parity with comparable private sector 
employées as the principal criterion for public sector settlements3. Some 
provincial governments, too, are beginning to implement mechanisms 
whereby they can monitor public sector pay scales in relation to those in the 
private sector, presumably for the purpose of better maintaining parity. 
The a priori arguments for setting public sector pay at parity with the 
private sector are strong, and are reviewed elsewhere4. One resuit of the 
strict maintenance of parity with the private sector would be that public sec-
tor pay rates would track private sector rates in response to price inflation 
and to changes in labour market conditions, so that there would be no sig-
nificant différence between the two sectors in cyclical pay responses. 
It is the purpose of this paper to assess empirically the extent to which 
public sector pay rates do closely track the private sector in response to 
cyclical changes; and to détermine whether the introduction of collective 
bargaining in the public sector has altered this relationship in any significant 
way. In this study, the public sector is defined to include only employées in 
provincial public administration. We exclude provincial employées in 
health, éducation, and government enterprise, as well as ail public employ-
ées at the fédéral and municipal levels. Such restriction is necessary in order 
to obtain units of observation which are homogeneous with respect to appli-
cable collective bargaining législation. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Our interest is in detecting how the process of pay détermination dif-
fers between public and private sectors. In particular, we are interested in 
detecting public/private sector différences in pay responsiveness to labour 
3 House of Commons of Canada, An Act to Amend the Public Service Staff Relations 
Act, March 8, 1978; and An Act to Amend the Public Service Staff Relations Act and to Estab-
lish the National Pay Research Board, November 21, 1978. 
4 For a review of thèse arguments, see CHRISTENSEN, 1980, pp. 42-45, or 
GUNDERSON, 1977. 
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market conditions and to changes in the rate of inflation, both before and 
after the collective bargaining privilège has been granted to public sector 
employées. 
There are previous studies which hâve obtained comparative public/ 
private sector estimâtes of the pay détermination process: one by Jean-
Michel Cousineau and Robert Lacroix (CL), published by the Economie 
Council of Canada in 1977; and two by Auld, Christofides, Swidinsky, and 
Wilton (ACSW), published by the Anti-Inflation Board and by the Cana-
dian Journal of Economies in 1979. 
However, because the data base used in each of thèse studies is drawn 
from a Labour Canada compilation of collective bargains, the authors can-
not address the question of whether or not the introduction of collective 
bargaining in the public sector has changea the nature of the link between 
public and private sector pay. They can only address the question of 
whether or not the pay détermination process differs between public and 
private sectors given the existence of collective bargaining in both sectors. 
Further, with respect to the latter question, the conclusions reached in 
the studies by CL and ACSW are contradictory. CL (p. 61) found that 
public sector wage settlements were significantly more price responsive and 
significantly less market responsive than private sector settlements. ACSW 
(AIB, p. 194) found no significant différence in the déterminants of wage 
settlements between public and private sectors when both negotiated and ar-
bitrated settlements were included in the sample; when only negotiated set-
tlements were included, ACSW {CJE, p. 200) found no significant différ-
ence between public and private sectors in price responsiveness, but they ob-
tained the surprising resuit that public sector settlements were significantly 
more responsive to labour market conditions than private sector settlements 
were. 
There are econometric problems présent in thèse studies, with estima-
tion biases probably resulting which might be sufficient to account for the 
contradictory results5.While further work on the collective bargains data set 
would be valuable, to eliminate insofar as is possible the flaws in existing 
studies, it seems worthwhile as well to obtain estimâtes using an alternative 
data base which will permit an assessment of how public sector collective 
bargaining has changea the process of pay détermination in the public sec-
tor, relative to the standard provided by the private sector. 
5 Consider first the CL study. The major problem with this study is that the authors 
failed to exclude from their sample those collective bargains which included a cost-of-living ad-
justment (COLA) clause. Since the wage incrément data used do not include any COLA adjust-
ment, this means that the dépendent (wage) variable is measured with error for ail of those bar-
gains which included a COLA clause, and that the size of the measurement error is correlated 
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SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
We hâve collected data on average weekly earnings, separately for 
private sector employées and for employées in provincial public administra-
tion, annually by province for the years from 1962 through 1975. Québec 
and British Columbia are not included in the sample due to their failure to 
report complète public administration payroll data over the period of obser-
vation. This period is useful for our purpose because it is during this time 
that collective bargaining privilèges were gradually extended to public sector 
employées in ail provincial jurisdictions6. 
We use thèse earnings data to estimate the parameters of the following 
équation7: 
WRATIO = a (PDOT)b (VR)C 
or, in the log-linear form actually used for the régressions: 
LogWRATIO = Loga + b LogPDOT + c LogVR 
where: 
WRATIO = the ratio of public to private sector average weekly earnings; 
PDOT = the annual rate of increase in the (ail-items) consumer price 
index, lagged one-half year; 
VR = a regionalized vacancy rate, based on the job vacancy survey. 
with the rate of inflation, which appears as one of the principal explanatory variables in the CL 
régressions. This has the effect of biasing the estimated régression coefficients, with the resuit 
that CL may hâve underestimated wage responsiveness to price inflation. Further, since CL 
présent figures from their data set showing that the existence of COLA clauses is far more 
prévalent in the private sector than in the public sector, any underestimation of wage respon-
siveness to price inflation is likely to be more severe for their private sector équation. Hence, 
the significant différence in price responsiveness they find, with the public sector being more 
responsive than the private sector, may be a spurious resuit arising from estimation bias. 
The problem in the ACSW study concerns the authors' choice of a measure for labour 
market conditions. They use the regionalized help-wanted index (published by the Department 
of Finance) divided by the labour force. However, because this index is normalized at 100 for 
1969 for each région, it is not appropriate for the use made of it by ACSW. Comparison of in-
dex values across régions is meaningless, and yet ACSW must make such comparisons in their 
régressions on a data set of collective bargains pooled over régions and time. 
Hère too, then, measurement error introduces estimation bias into the results, with the 
coefficient estimated for the labour market conditions variable (the one measured with error) 
the most seriously affected. Hence, the anomolous finding by ACSW of equal or greater wage 
responsiveness to labour market conditions in the public sector than in the private sector may 
also be a spurious resuit arising from estimation bias. 
6 Complète public sector payroll data are not available for any province prior to 1962; 
and data for the years after 1975 are subject to the distortion caused by the introduction of 
wage and price controls. 
7 This model is borrowed, in modified form, from HALL's (1975) study of relative 
wage ridigidy across major U.S. industries. 
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In this équation, the parameters hâve the following interprétation: 
a = the average ratio, over the period of observation, of average weekly 
earnings in provincial public administration relative to those in the 
private sector after eliminating cyclical influences. This might be 
greater or less than one (zéro in log form), depending on the skill re-
quirements of public administration relative to the private sector in-
dustry mix. We allow this parameter to vary by province to reflect 
the différent industry (and hence skill) mix characteristics of the 
private sector in each province. 
b,c = a measure of the extent to which the relationship between average 
weekly earnings in the public and private sectors changes in re-
sponse to cyclical fluctuations in inflation (b) and labour market 
conditions (c). Hère, a coefficient of zéro would indicate that earn-
ings in public administration are neither more nor less rigid than 
those in the private sector; a négative coefficient would indicate 
greater rigidity (less cyclical responsiveness) in public sector earn-
ings than in the private sector. Only if the estimâtes for both b and c 
are nonsignificantly différent from zéro can we conclude that public 
sector earnings are closely tracking the private sector, as the main-
tenance of parity would dictate. 
We want also to test for the possibility that public/private sector différ-
ences in earnings responsiveness to labour market conditions might vary 
over the cycle. To accomplish this, we include a shift variable (VRDUM) 
which is equal to the vacancy rate when the vacancy rate is above its (région-
al) average over the period of observation, and zéro otherwise. This permits 
the labour market parameter (c) to take on two différent values: one for 
slack labour markets; and another for buoyant markets. 
Finally, because we are interested in how public sector cyclical respon-
siveness, relative to the standard provided by the private sector, has been 
altered by changes in the législation governing public sector collective bar-
gaining, we allow the cyclical parameters (b and c) to vary across three caté-
gories of observations, differentiated by applicable public sector collective 
bargaining législation. Of the 112 observations in our sample, 52 were for 
provinces and years in which collective bargaining was not légal for employ-
ées in provincial public administration. Thirty-four were for provinces and 
years in which collective bargaining was permitted, but with arbitration 
(ARB) as the only légal impasse procédure. Twenty-six were for provinces 
and years in which collective bargaining was permitted and in which the 
strike (STR) was légal. 
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In ail provinces throughout the period of observation, législation 
governing collective bargaining for private sector employées was uniform, 
permitting organization, bargaining, and the strike, so that no variable is re-
quired for this. 
In addition to the principal explanatory variables introduced above, we 
found it useful to include a variable which is the ratio of part-time to total 
employées in each provincial public administration (PARTIME). This is in-
cluded in an attempt to control for the probable measurement error présent 
in the calculation of average weekly earnings for public employées73. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Since our data set is a pooled cross-section time-series, we must con-
sider both the problems of heteroscedasticity and of autocorrélation. The 
use of a separate intercept for each cross-section (i.e. provincial) observa-
tion is an approach suggested by Murphy (1973, pp. 360-361) to deal with 
the heteroscedasticity problem. We tested for autocorrélation as well, but 
found no évidence that this was a problem for our data set8. 
The spécifie équations estimated are presented in Table 1. The data ap-
pendix gives the full définition and sources for each variable used. 
We interpret the estimation results as follows. The coefficients attach-
ed to the cyclical variables LogPDOT, LogVR, and VRDUM are estimâtes 
of public relative to private sector earnings responsiveness in the absence of 
public sector collective bargaining. The coefficients attached to 
ARB*PDOT, ARB*VR, and ARB*VRDUM are shift parameters which are 
applicable when collective bargaining, with arbitration as the only légal im-
passe procédure, is allowed. The coefficients attached to STR*PDOT, 
STR*VR, and STR*VRDUM are shift parameters which are applicable 
when collective bargaining, with the strike as a légal impasse procédure, is 
allowed. 
The estimation results show that none of the coefficients attached to 
the VRDUM variables are significantly différent from zéro, either singly 
(based on the t-statistics reported in équation 1) or as a group (based on a 
7a For a discussion of this problem, a technical appendix is available upon request to the 
author. 
8 We estimated the first-order autocorrélation coefficient from a régression of the resi-
duals from équation 3 on those same residuals lagged one year. We used the résultant estimate 
for " R H O " to calculate the Durbin-Watson statistic. The DW value fell in the inconclusive 
région, so that we could neither accept nor reject the hypothesis of sériai corrélation. We chose 
to make no correction. 
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F-test between équation 1 and équation 2)9. A priori arguments might be 
made that compétition from private sector employers would force public 
sector pay increases to be comparable to those gotten in the private sector in 
response to tight labour market conditions, but that no analogous force ex-
ists to hold public sector pay increases down to the level of those received in 
the private sector during times of labour market slack. There is no évidence 
of such asymmetry in relative public to private sector responses to labour 
market conditions in our data. Public sector pay rigidity relative to the 
private sector does not appear to vary significantly over the cycle. Hence, 
we eliminate the VRDUM variable from our final estimation results in 
équation 3. However, it should be noted that the failure of this variable to 
perform may be the resuit of our use of a simple earnings figure, rather than 
the more appropriate "full pay" figure which would include the monetized 
value of fringe benefits. To the extent that public sector fringe benefits are 
more generous than those typically available in the private sector, public 
sector earnings may lag behind private sector earnings during buoyant 
periods without resulting recruiting problems in the public sector. 
The estimation results also indicate that public sector pay rigidity does 
not differ significantly between those observations for which no public sec-
tor collective bargaining is allowed and those for which public sector bar-
gaining is allowed, but with arbitration as the only légal impasse procédure. 
This can be seen from the t-statistics associated with the ARB variables in 
équations 1 and 2; as well as from an F-test comparison of équation 2 and 
équation 310. However, collective bargaining with the strike does change the 
cyclical responsiveness of the public sector, relative to the private sector. 
Hence, we eliminate the ARB variable, but retain the STR variable in our 
final estimation results in équation 3. 
The estimâtes for équation 3 indicate that in the absence of any public 
sector collective bargaining over pay, public sector pay scales are signifi-
cantly more responsive to récent price inflation and significantly less re-
sponsive to labour market conditions than private sector pay scales are. 
When collective bargaining without the strike is made available to public 
sector employées, there is no significant change in thèse différences. How-
ever, when collective bargaining with the strike is made available to public 
sector employées, this has the effect of significantly reducing (by about one-
half) the différences between public and private sector responsiveness, both 
to price inflation and to labour market conditions; the différences that re-
main are still significant11. 
9 The test value is F = .922, compared to the critical value of F^3 '9^) = 2.7. 
10 The test value is F = 2.079, compared to the critical value of F ^ 2 ' 9 ^ = 3.1. 
n The t-value for the relative price response is (.090 — .051)/.0155 = 2.516. The t-value 
for the relative labour market response is (—.090 + 0.39)/.0241 + —2.116. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Prior to drawing policy implications from thèse results, it is désirable 
to point out some potential problems in the interprétation of the results. 
Our model assumes that any systematic change in the ratio of public to 
private sector average weekly earnings will arise in response to cyclical 
variation in the economy, as measured by the vacancy rate and the rate of 
inflation. However there may be secular changes in the ratio as well, per-
haps due to a secular change in employée skill requirements in either public 
administration or in the private sector industry mix. We attempted to in-
clude a time trend variable in the estimated équation in order to control for 
this possibility, but found the time trend so highly correlated with the 
PDOT variable that inclusion of both was impossible. Hence, the coeffi-
cient estimated for PDOT may pick up some secular effects as well as the 
cyclical response we désire. 
A second potential problem is that our measure of pay includes (of 
necessity) only earnings, and hence is not the "full pay" measure that is 
theoretically appropriate for a comparison between public and private sec-
tor compensation. It is possible that cyclical changes observed in the earn-
ings ratio between public and private sectors are offset by compensating 
changes in the value of fringe benefits. If this occurs, then the "full pay" 
responses of public and private sectors could be similar and consistent with 
the maintenance of parity, despite the absence of such results for our earn-
ings measure. However, this seems unlikely. If there is any cyclical variation 
in the relative value of fringes, it seems more likely that it would accentuate 
rather than offset the changes observed in the earnings ratio. The relative 
gain in earnings for the public sector during inflation is likely to be still 
greater once the enhanced value of a price-indexed pension plan, which is 
more typical of the public than the private sector, is considered. The relative 
maintenance of earnings levels for the public sector during slack labour 
markets is also likely to be still more pronounced once a value is placed on 
the lower probability of lay-off in the public sector relative to the private 
sector. Hence, the différence we estimate between public and private sectors 
in cyclical response would not likely be eliminated by considération of 
fringe benefits, were such data available. 
Subject to the caveats mentioned, our results indicate, for the provin-
cial public administration, that: 
a) without collective bargaining, public sector pay scales more responsive 
to récent price inflation, and less responsive to labour market condi-
tions, than private sector pay scales; 
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b) there is no significant change in the size of thèse différences when 
public sector collective bargaining is allowed, but does not include the 
right to strike; 
c) when the public sector collective bargaining privilège does include the 
right to strike, this has the effect of making public sector wage re-
sponses more similar to those in the private sector, but significant dif-
férences still remain. 
If the maintenance of parity is the goal in public sector pay détermina-
tion, then our results indicate that public sector pay détermination via col-
lective bargaining with the strike is préférable to pay détermination by col-
lective bargaining without the right to strike or by unilatéral employer 
action, because public sector pay scales track the private sector more closely 
under collective bargaining with the strike than under either of the two 
alternatives. 
We can only speculate about the reasons for this, but we think that the 
following reasoning may be plausible. The évidence seems to indicate that in 
the absence of collective bargaining, the public employer is quick to adjust 
pay scales only in response to changes in the price level, thus tending to 
maintain the real value of public sector pay regardless of labour market 
conditions (at least until recruiting problems develop). This may be because 
changes in the price level are easy to observe, both for employer and em-
ployées, whereas current information on compétitive pay scales in the 
private sector requires a more costly monitoring effort. With the ad vent of 
collective bargaining, one would expect both public employer and employée 
groups to implement procédures to better monitor pay scales in compétitive 
private sector employment, resulting in a greater reliance on labour market 
conditions, and hence a reduced reliance on simple price level adjustments 
in the process of pay détermination. This is the resuit we find when public 
sector collective bargaining is accompanied by the right to strike. It is per-
plexing, though, that this resuit is absent when arbitration is the only legi-
timate bargaining impasse procédure. Possible explanations for this différ-
ence in results between bargaining with arbitration versus bargaining with 
the strike might be based on: 
1) the characteristics of the arbitration process, in which the arbitrator is 
usually a lawyer, untrained in making appropriate use of labour market 
information. He may thus duplicate the public employer's tendency to 
rely heavily on simple price level adjustments in the absence of pressure 
to do otherwise arising from the threat of strike or severe recruiting 
problems. 
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2) the characteristics of the strike situation, in which the strike threat 
enables public employées more effectively to insist on pay increases in 
excess of price level adjustments when real pay in the private sector is 
rising; but in which the threat or occurrence of a strike may also serve 
to focus public attention on the pay scale in the public sector, thus con-
straining the public employer from granting increases in excess of those 
won in the private sector more effectively than would be the case if set-
tlements were reached out of the public spotlight. 
An important implication of our results is that, contrary to widely ex-
pressed fears, the introduction of collective bargaining into the public sector 
has not weakened the parity link between public and private sector pay 
scales. The link was already weak before the advent of collective bargain-
ing, resulting from unilatéral pay détermination by the public employer. 
This conclusion is buttressed by évidence from Smith's (1977) study of 
public sector pay in the United States. In that study, Smith found a pay pre-
mium existed for most public employées at ail levels of government whether 
or not pay was set by collective bargaining in the public sector. She found 
that the size of the pay premium was consistently related to the size and level 
of government. Public employées in local government received little or no 
premium, but those working for larger cities were more likely to get a 
premium than those working for small towns. The probability and size of 
the public sector premium increased for state employées and increased still 
more for fédéral employées even though fédéral employées are not permit-
ted to bargain over pay in the United States. Smith attributes the resuit to 
the prédominance of political influences on the public employée. 
"Thus, any décision on government wages must take into considération its impact 
on votes for the legislators in power. If, as Downs (1957) suggests, voters become in-
formed only on issues of immédiate concern to them, lawmakers will be most con-
cernée! with the reaction of government workers to their wage décisions. The political 
nature of thèse décisions gives rise to an inhérent upward bias to government wages 
that is unchecked by market forces. The same forces that lead to this upward bias 
lead to an increase in the bias with an increase in the size of the governmental unit. 
As the number of government workers and the number of issues concerning the 
government unit increase, the political power of government workers with respect to 
wage décisions probably increases relatively more than that of other voters." (Smith 
1977, p. 134). 
If public/private sector pay parity is the goal to be achieved, thèse 
results suggest that a major impediment to its achievement is the absence of 
effective incentives operating on the public employer to prevent offering 
employées more than parity would require. (Compétition from private sec-
tor employers should assure that the public employer cannot for long offer 
less than parity would require, if the public sector is to retain its work 
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force.) Out of the spotlight of public attention, the incentives facing the 
public employer apparently induce the offer of more than parity would 
require. 
Whether or not collective bargaining exists in the public sector, our 
results suggest that it is necessary to alter the environment in which the 
public employer makes décisions on pay and promotion if the parity link 
with the private sector is to be close. At a minimum, it would seem désirable 
to set up a fact-finding agency in each provincial jurisdiction, similar to the 
Pay Research Bureau in the fédéral jurisdiction, whose mandate is not only 
to collect, but also to publicize, the data necessary for public /private pay 
comparisons. Further, comparisons should be made not only by job title, as 
is currently done by the Pay Research Bureau, but also by employée charac-
teristics. The latter is the more useful comparison for two reasons: 1) job ti-
tle descriptions are sometimes not comparable between public and private 
sectors; and 2) the public employer may disguise pay increases in excess of 
parity in the form of rapid promotion through the job classification 
structure12. 
Public information concerning a pay premium in the public sector rela-
tive to the private sector for employées with comparable training and expéri-
ence might then be used both as impetus and ammunition by taxpayer 
groups seeking ways to reduce the expense of government. Given easy 
public access to comparative data on public and private sector pay scales, 
public pressure might be sufficient to restrain the generosity of the public 
employer with respect to pay and promotions. If not, considération might 
be given to introducing a system of financial incentives, whereby the pay 
received by those in public sector management positions would be inversely 
related to the size of the pay premium, relative to comparable private sector 
employées, received by the public employées under their direction13. 
12 See pp. 23-34 in SMITH (1977) for a discussion of the bases for pay comparison. 
13 One conséquence of maintaining strict comparability with the private sector is that 
any labour market discrimination against females or certain ethnie groups would be transmit-
ted to the public sector as well. To présent this it may be désirable to permit some public sector 
premium for those groups who are discriminated against in the private sector. 
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TABLE 1 
Régression Estimâtes 
Variable Name Variable Mean Equations (t-values in parenthesis) 
Dépendent: 
LogWRATIO —.065 
Independent 1 2 3 
NF .125 —.093 (1.89) —.089(2.69) —.099 ( 3.00) 
PEI .125 .084(1.71) .085 (2.63) .072 ( 2.26) 
NS .125 —.097(1.84) —.095 (2.57) —.108( 2.95) 
NB .125 .081 (1.50) .086 (2.49) .073 ( 2.14) 
ONT .125 .058(1.31) .063 (2.20) .069 ( 2.44) 
MAN .125 .158(3.21) .157(4.91) .149 ( 4.67) 
SAS .125 .161 (2.93) .162(3.97) .146 ( 3.63) 
ALB .125 .058(1.21) .057(1.80) .049 ( 1.55) 
PARTIME .178 —.276 (3.35) —.258(3.17) —.213 ( 2.72) 
LogPDOT 1.308 .071 (5.87) .076 (6.51) .090 (12.94) 
ARB*PDOT .513 .014 (0.77) .077 (0.41) 
STR*PDOT .356 —.031 (1.50) —.038 (2.01) —.051 ( 3.13) 
LogVR 2.117 —.084 (3.35) —.086 (5.17) —.090 ( 5.48) 
ARB*VR .642 .010 (0.71) .006 (0.44) 
STR*VR .487 .033 (1.99) .032(1.96) .039 ( 2.52) 
VRDUM 1.078 .006(1.01) 
ARB*VRDUM .394 —.012(1.52) 
STR*VRDUM .209 —.009(1.02) 
R2 .932 .930 .927 
S.E.E. .034 .034 .034 
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La négociation collective dans 
la fonction publique provinciale 
Le but de cet article est d'établir d'une façon empirique jusqu'à quel point les 
taux de salaires dans le secteur public s'alignent sur ceux du secteur privé face aux 
changements cycliques de l'économie mesurés en tenant compte à la fois de l'infla-
tion et des emplois disponibles sur le marché du travail. Il vise aussi à déterminer si 
l'introduction de la négociation collective dans le secteur public a modifié ce rapport 
d'une façon significative. Nous le faisons à partir des statistiques relatives aux salai-
res des employés du secteur public dans la fonction publique provinciale et de ceux 
des employés de l'ensemble du secteur industriel privé, qu'il y ait ou non négociation 
collective dans le secteur public. Les taux de salaires du secteur public sont plus sen-
sibles à l'inflation et moins sensibles aux conditions du marché du travail que les taux 
de salaires du secteur privé. 
Une des conséquences de cette constatation, c'est que, contrairement à des 
craintes largement répandues, l'introduction de la négociation collective dans le sec-
teur public n'a pas affaibli le lien de parité entre les échelles de salaires du secteur 
public et celles du secteur privé. En effet, le lien était déjà faible avant l'avènement 
de la négociation collective, parce que l'employeur du secteur public fixait les salaires 
unilatéralement. Si l'établissement de la parité des salaires entre le secteur public et le 
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secteur privé est la fin recherchée, cette constatation permet de voir qu'un des obsta-
cles principaux à sa réalisation réside dans l'absence de motifs suffisamment forts de 
la part de l'employeur du secteur public pour l'empêcher d'offrir aux employés plus 
que la parité l'exigerait. (La concurrence des employeurs du secteur privé ferait que 
l'employeur du secteur public ne pourrait pas pendant longtemps offrir moins que la 
parité l'exigerait, si le secteur public veut conserver sa main-d'oeuvre.) Si l'on fait 
abstraction de l'opinion publique, les motifs auxquels l'employeur du secteur public 
a à faire face le poussent apparemment à offrir plus que la parité l'exigerait. 
Qu'il existe ou non de négociation collective dans le secteur public, les résultats 
de l'enquête indiquent qu'il est nécessaire de modifier «l'environnement» dans le-
quel l'employeur du service public prend ses décisions en matière de salaires et de 
promotions si l'on veut que le lien de parité avec le secteur privé soit plus serré. Pour 
le moins, il serait désirable de mettre sur pied, dans chaque province, une agence, 
semblable au Bureau de recherches sur les traitements qui existe au gouvernement 
fédéral, dont le mandat serait à la fois de recueillir et de diffuser les statistiques com-
paratives des salaires entre le secteur public et le secteur privé. De plus, les comparai-
sons ne devraient pas se faire par appellation d'emploi uniquement comme au gou-
vernement fédéral, mais en tenant compte des fonctions des employés. Cette dernière 
méthode est la plus utile pour deux motifs: I e , parfois, les descriptions par appella-
tion d'emploi ne sont pas comparables entre le secteur public et le secteur privé; 2e , 
l'employeur du secteur public peut déguiser des augmentations de salaires supérieu-
res à la parité sous forme de promotion rapide au moyen de la structure de classifica-
tion des emplois. 
L'information diffusée à l'occasion d'une augmentation de salaires dans le sec-
teur public par rapport à ce qui existe dans le secteur privé pour les employés qui ont 
une formation et une expérience comparables peut servir d'impulsion et de munition 
aux groupes de contribuables qui cherchent des moyens de réduire les dépenses du 
gouvernement. En facilitant l'accès du public à des statistiques comparant les échel-
les de salaires du secteur public et du secteur privé, il peut être possible de contenir la 
générosité de l'employeur du secteur public en matière de salaires et de promotions. 
Sinon, il faudrait penser à introduire un système de stimulants financiers par lequel le 
traitement des cadres du secteur public serait inversement relié à l'amplitude de 
l'augmentation de salaires obtenues par les fonctionnaires placés sous leur autorité 
par rapport aux salaires des employés du secteur privé. 
Toutefois, la comparaison exacte entre le secteur privé et le secteur public aurait 
pour conséquence de maintenir, au détriment des femmes et de certains groupes eth-
niques, les discriminations qui existent sur le marché du travail. Pour éviter ce dan-
ger, il serait souhaitable d'accorder à ces groupes du secteur public certains ra-
justements de salaires. 
